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infinite imaged in the finite, the finite is taken up into the infinite.
For Schelling, the symbolic is where both the general and the particular are ab-
solute. Some examples of the symbolic are : art, philosophy (from the standpoint of
arithmetic or geometry), sculpture, and drama. In the domain of the religious, Maria
is the symbol of the "eternal woman." In the gospels there are symbolic actions : the
baptism in the Jordan, the Last Supper. The church and its liturgy are symbolic.
Angels are symbols of good and evil. Indeed, any seeing of the infinite in the finite is
a symbolic endeavor (SW III, 427-467 ; on angels cf. p. 357). The symbolical, as art
generally, is tied up... More >with Schelling's rich notion of the potencies (Potenzen), which,
in the Philosophy of Mythology, will be tied into what he terms the théogonie process,
whereby the histories or stories of the Gods (Gôttergeschichte) actually come to be in
consciousness. The potencies represent the content implied or involved in this proc-
ess.
It is in this context that the phrase "the last God" (der letzte Gott) occurs in
Schelling (SW III, 452). He insists that the divine becoming human differs in pagan-
ism and in Christianity. In the latter there is a finitude that has fallen away from God
which, in the person of the Christ, is reconciled with God through an annihilation
(Vernichtung) of that fallen finitude. Drawing upon the notion of kenosis, from
Philippians 2:6-8 — God emptying himself out, taking the form of servant, etc. —
Schelling says that in self-sacrificing his infinitude it is as if (als ob) Christ puts an
end to the old time (alten Zeii), the old world of the pagan Gods : Christ is simply
there to set the limit : the last God. God is the apex {Gipfel), and the end, of the old
world of the Gods.
Thus, while earlier acknowledging the greatness of Greek religion and poetry,
Schelling insists that "the last God" represents the end of the old world, a world
tragically fated to pass away with Christianity. God become human, the infinite in the
finite, is the end of the old world of the Gods (SW III, 312-314). It looks forward to
(Vorsehung), and prepares for, a new age. The new age is that of the Spirit, the ideal
principle, the dominant soul of the new world (SW III, 452).
In his Philosophy of Mythology, lectures given at Berlin in 1842 (though earlier
in Munich, in 1827 and 1831), Schelling examines in greater detail the meaning of
myth. The histories or stories of the Gods (Gôttergeschichte) represent a théogonie
process, that is, it is a subjective process. Still, although mythology naturally repre-
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HEIDEGGER'S LAST GOD AND THE SCHELLING CONNECTION
sents a God-positing on the part of consciousness,21 the question "How does con-
sciousness come to God ?" is, in his view, the wrong question. Rather, the first
motion comes from God, representing an event that is above and beyond history
(iibergeschichtliches Ereignis, SW VI, 188, 193). In other words, although the proc-
ess is subjective the content of the process is the potencies (Potenzen), which are the
actual and in themselves théogonie powers.22 Schelling will later speak of the Christ
as a cosmic power (kosmische Potenz, SWVI, 251). Schelling sees Christ as the
eternal mediator between the divine and the human. Christ (Christianity) is older than
the world, in the world before the world is (SW VI, 579). Such théogonie powers,
again, have an objective meaning, not merely a subjective one (SW VI, 348). Thus, it
is not the divine Self that is in consciousness, but only a mirror-image (Gleichbild) of
it. Further, it has a meaning that is not only religious but a general one as well
(SWVI, 214, 218).
When Schelling comes to the monotheism section of the Philosophy of Mythol-
ogy, he speaks of God as being itself (Seyende selbst) ; this is the basis for God's
uniqueness. God is not Seyn, but the general possibility of being (Seyn, SW VI,
28Iff.). It is in this sense that God's essence is his existence (Seyn) ; which essence is
"to-be" (seyn wird). This accords with Schelling's rendering of God's reply to Moses
in Exodus 3:14, the "name" of God : "I will be what I will be." It is the freedom or
existence (the authentic) side of God that overcomes the ground or nature side of
God, as Schelling sets this up in his On the Essence of Human Freedom. And because
that existence is free, he maintains that it is outside being. God is the immediate can-
be (unmittelbar Seyn-konnende). This is not some mere passive potentiality, but the
actual can-be of an active will (SW VI, 287-293). It is Spirit, the can-be of the divine
ground as the beginning of its being (Anfang seines Seyns).23
The themes touched upon in Schelling's earlier works come to theological frui-
tion in his Philosophy of Revelation (lectures given at Berlin in 1842, again in
1845/1846, and previously from 1831 on). One thing new in the later Schelling is that
he transfers the nature or ground (the dark side) of God, as set up in On the Essence
of Human Freedom, to the bad angels (SW VI, 676 ; cf. also 633ff.). One item of
interest, in relation to Heidegger, is the way Schelling defines faith : it is to take as
true (fur wahr zu halten, SW VI, 409). Heidegger uses the same phrase to describe
faith in the Beitràge.24 Schelling refers to the New Testament as a new and second
creation, not an event (Ereignis) that had to happen by necessity, but the manifesta-
tion of the most free and personal will of God, an extra-ordinary event (SW VI, 403-
404, 416). The "first beginning" is creation (SW VI, 498) — or is it the Seyn that is
the Father as the source and principle of the divinity (fans et principium divinitatis) ?
At any rate, the second beginning is the Son, who possesses Seyn, the appearance of
the second potency (Erscheinung der zweiten Potenz) ; this is a new process and one
21. "[...] natiirlich Gott-Setzenden des BewuBtseyns [...]" (SW VI, 247).
22. "[...] die wirklich und an sich theogonischen Mâchte [...]" (SW VI, 209).
23. SW VI, 297-298. As Schelling will say later, God is essentially freedom (SW VI, 504).
24. Beitrdge, p. 368-369.
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GEORGE J. SEIDEL
in human consciousness.25 This Seyn, he insists, is outside the Father, the Father as
the "substance" for the Seyn of the Son (SW VI, 442, 452). Indeed, the Son is so
completely God that God (Father) would not be God without the Son (SW VI, 504).
Nevertheless, although the first beginning is creation, the Logos is there in the
beginning (SW VI, 554). The beginning is an eternal one, neither before nor outside
the end (complete Spirit), the end neither before nor outside the beginning. Thus, the
beginning should be thought as there with the end, and the end as there v/ith the
beginning (SW 6, 259). In other words, as Schelling says later : "The beginning of
creation is also the beginning of the generation (Zeugung, or testimony) of the Son"
(SW 6, 323). This is, again, the eternal cosmic Christ.
In the Philosophy of Revelation, Schelling devotes some time and effort to an
exegesis of the Prologue to the gospel of John (SW VI, 481-510) — seemingly de
rigueur for the German idealist philosophers — as also an exegesis of Philippians
2:6-8 (SW VI, 431-442, 554-557). What he does, however, is to read John's Prologue
from the perspective of the kenosis theme in Philippians. Heidegger follows a similar
pattern in the Beitrâge. In this context Schelling criticizes Fichte's view of the Johan-
nine Logos as merely in knowledge (blofi im Wissen).26 Schelling, on the other hand,
takes the phrase "in the form of God" found in Philippians 2, reading it, in conjunc-
tion with the Johannine Logos, as a being outside-the-divine divine-being (aufier-
gôttlich-gottliche Seyn), the Godhead hidden (SW VI, 557). The Christ is the "eternal
mediator," his birth a final, but entirely external, event (Ereignifi), fully present in the
circle of other external givens.27 Schelling has the Christ as a mediator, indeed, as
very much an "intermediary being," since Christ is outside God in virtue of his
eternal humanity, outside and independent of the human in virtue of his divinity
25. SW VI, 429-431. The Potenzen are always connected with consciousness in Schelling, cf. SW 6, 65. The
third potency is, of course, the Spirit (SW VI, 457). This sets up the three time periods in Schelling : before
creation, the time of the Father ; the present, the time of the Son ; the future, that of the Spirit (SW VI,
463).
26. SW VI, 493-494. For a consideration of the Fichtean Logos, cf. G.J. SEIDEL, "The Atheism Controversy of
1799 and the Christology of Fichte's Anweisung zum seligen Leben of 1806," in New Perspectives on
Fichte, New York, Humanities Press, 1995, p. 143-151. Fichte gives a specifically theological, not to say
Christological, significance to the distinction between Seyn, as expressing absolute being (the Father) and
Daseyn, determinate being or actual existence (Son). Thus, in his exegesis of the Prologue to John's gospel
he says, "[...] the consciousness of being (Seyn), the Is relative to being, is immediately Daseyn" (Fichte's
sammtliche Werke, J.H. Fichte, éd., Berlin, Veit, 1845, V, 439-441) ; the Logos is the image of the absolute
being (Wesen) in the actual world (cf. ibid., V, 526). Fichte gets this distinction between Seyn and Daseyn
from Schelling, cf. Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie (1795), though in this early work of Schelling's
the orientation is primarily ethical (like the early Fichte), Daseyn in every age striving to posit itself as pure
Seyn ; the infinite task of practical reason is to make the absolute being and empirical existence (Daseyn)
identical (SW I, 133-134, with notes). In the Philosophy of Revelation, Schelling indicates an awareness of
Fichte's Anweisung (SW 6, 53).
27. "Diese Geburt ist ein letztes, aber vôllig àuBeres, ganz in den Kreis anderer âuBerer Begebenheiten
eintretendes EreigniB" (SW VI, 565). Schelling argues that Christ's resurrection is proof of the irrevocabil-
ity of the Incarnation (SW VI, 609).
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HEIDEGGER'S LAST GOD AND THE SCHELLING CONNECTION
(SW VI, 617). For Schelling, then, the Christ is neither, strictly speaking, divine nor
human, but something in between.28
Ill
The subtitle of Beitràge zur Philosophy is Worn Ereignis (Concerning the Event).
However, the word Ereignis has rich connotations in the Heideggerian vocabulary. In
Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology there is no special meaning attached to the word
Ereignis. When he comes to the Philosophy of Revelation,however, the word does
take on a special meaning.29 In Heidegger's Beitràge the word is often hyphenated
(Er-eignis), to indicate that he wishes it taken in its deeper etymological sense. Thus,
the event is an eye-opener (er-augen, open up one's eyes to). The word is also made
to relate to an-eignen and zu-eignen, which mean make one's own, take to oneself,
ap-propriate. In this connection he uses the neologism Er-eignung to indicate that
Seyn determines that human beings should become the property (Eigentum) of Seyn
(Beitràge, p. 263) as a result of their encounter with (Ent-gegnung), and decision for
(Ent-scheidung), Da-sein, the "being" that is very much "there."
The encountering of the divine and the human occurs in this Er-eignung (Bei-
tràge, p. 477). And Da-sein — the word is generally hyphenated in this work — is
the "in between" (das Zwischen) between the human and the divine.30 Thus, in the
Beitràge Heidegger speaks of Da-sein as the Between (das Zwischen) in between the
human, as the basis for history, and the divine, in its history (Beitràge, p. 311). Seyn
is the "in between" between the divine and the human.31 As noted above, a similar
position is adopted by Schelling in his Philosophy of Revelation : the Christ is neither
divine nor human but something in between.32
Heidegger draws a sharp distinction between Sein and Seyn in the Beitràge, a
new sort of "ontological difference." The distinction is in keeping with his earlier
stated program to get being (Sein) out of theology and being (Seyn) out of metaphys-
ics. If I am reading Heidegger correctly, he uses the older spelling for being (Seyn) to
refer to the divine being in Da-sein, as distinct from the human being-there as what is
first grasped (Vorgriff, Beitràge, p. 317). The distinction Fichte made between Seyn
(God) and Daseyn (Christ), with its background in Schelling, was noted above (cf.
28. SW VI 577-578. Which position Xavier TlLLlETTE (Le Christ de la philosophie. Prolégomènes à une
christologie philosophique, Paris, Cerf, 1990, p. 160) dubs modalist, the view that distinctions within the
Godhead are only transitory.
29. SW VI, 404, 565. In an earlier piece, "A Key to Heidegger's Beitràge" I cited Bultmann in this connec-
tion. In his commentary on John's gospel, Bultmann speaks of the Logos of the Prologue as the Ereignis
(Das Evangelium des Johannes, 18 éd., Gôttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964 [reprint of the 1941,
10th éd.], p. 7) ; the judgment of the world (Weltgericht), the eschatologische Ereignis, is implicit in that
event (ibid., p. 111).
30. Beitràge, p. 311. In his commentary on John's gospel Bultmann also sees the Christ as the Zwischenwesen
(Das Evangelium des Johannes, p. 12).
31. Beitràge, p. 470-471. Seyn is the Between in the midst of beings and the Gods, and, from that perspective,
incomparable, "needed" by the latter, hidden from the former (ibid., p. 244).
32. SW VI, 577-578.
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GEORGE J. SEIDEL
footnote 26). However, Heidegger parts company with both Schelling and Fichte
when he says that it is impossible to get to Seyn from the understanding of Sein that
derives from human subjectivity (Beitràge, p. 259). Da-sein represents the overcom-
ing of all subjectivity.33
Heidegger goes along with Schelling in believing that there is no rational ap-
proach to God, above all when it comes to the meaning of Da-sein. Heidegger,
however, would go further and remove the element of consciousness and subjectivity
entirely from Schelling's théogonie process. When it comes to the meaning of the last
God, he says, all scientific knowledge is impossible, and dialectic will be of no avail
(Beitràge, p. 407-412). This may remind one of Kierkegaard's objections to
Hegelianism in the Philosophical Fragments, and the necessity of a leap of faith
relative to the Paradox. No reason, says Heidegger, can be given for the revelation
(Wesung) that is Seyn (Beitràge, p. 509). Indeed, there is a Kierkegaardian, as well as
a Schellingian, connection in Heidegger's Beitràge. Thus, he insists that there is no
direct road leading from the Sein of things to Seyn, since the viewpoint of the being
of things is outside the Augenblicklichkeit of Dasein (Beitràge, p. 75). One may again
hear echoes from Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments : the moment of faith
relating to the moment that was the Paradox (the infinite in the finite) "in the mo-
ment."
In the "Monotheism" section of his Philosophy of Mythology, Schelling speaks of
God as being itself (das Seyende selbst), but not as Seyn, since the essence of God is
"to-be" (seyn wird), which "to-be" is, as such, outside being (Seyn). Heidegger, on
the other hand, insists that God is not a being (ein Seiendes) least of all the highest
being (das Seiendeste, Beitràge, p. 472). Likewise for Heidegger, God is not to be
identified with Seyn ; rather, Seyn reveals itself tempo-spatially (zeit-râumlich) as the
Between ; which "in between" is never grounded in God, nor in the human, as some-
thing living and at hand, but instead in Da-sein (Beitràge, p. 263). As the "in be-
tween" between the human and the divine there occurs with Da-sein an Ent-gegnung,
the encountering of the divine and the human in the appropriation (Er-eignung) of the
human by the divine (Beitràge, p. 311, 477). "Making this truth one's own" (ap-
propriation) is, from the human side, Heidegger's description of faith : knowledge of
the essential (Das wesentliche Wissen). Faith for Heidegger, as for Schelling, is Fiir-
wahr-halten : holding onto what is taken as true.34 As suggested above, Heidegger
uses the word Seyn to refer to the divine being in Da-sein. Again, this represents the
newer version of the "ontological difference," which, he maintains, grounds the
earlier one in his thought.35 Das Seyn west, he says, das Seiende "/sf."36 Again, for
33. Beitràge, p. 303. The relation between Da-sein and das Seyn is not a subject-object relationship (Beitràge,
p. 254). In the recently published 1929 summer semester lectures, Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schel-
ling, Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 28, Frankfurt am
Main : Klostermann, 1997, Heidegger criticizes the subjectivism of German idealism as a continuation of
Cartesian subjectivism (p. 130, 271).
34. Beitràge, p. 368-369. Earlier in "Phànomenologie und Théologie," p. 52-53, Heidegger had described faith,
in typically Johannine fashion, as Wiedergeburt in and through der gekreuzigte Gott.
35. "[...] das Seiende is grounded in the Wesung des Seyns and has its origin therein" (Beitràge, p. 465). Is this
the "all things were created through the Word" of John's Prologue ?
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HEIDEGGER'S LAST GOD AND THE SCHELLING CONNECTION
Heidegger God is not Seyn ; rather, Seyn "west" spatio-temporally as the "in be-
tween" (Beitràge, p. 263). And how does it "west ?" It "west" as a bold and risky
venture (Wagnis), it "west" as the "in between" (Beitràge, p. 475-476). It represents a
leap (Sprung), a risky venturing forth (Wagnis), into the being's history (Seins-
geschichte)?1 The verb "west" derives its meaning, I think, from another of Heideg-
ger's neologisms — so far as I am aware peculiar to this work — namely Wesung, a
word found at the beginning of the work, at the end, and throughout. He speaks of the
Ereignis as the Wesung des Seyns (Beitràge, p. 7). Also, he speaks of Wesung as the
Sagen "des" Seyns, where "des" is a genitive of a peculiar sort. Wesung, I would
suggest, is simply Bultmann's Offenbarung, revelation, what Seyn does when it
"west" The "of" Seyn's bespeaking (Sagen) is of a peculiar sort in that the Logos is
not only the revelation "of God, it is that revelation. In other words, what Seyn does
when it "west" in the Er-eignis is reveal itself : "In the revelation of the truth of
Being, in the Event and as the Event, is hidden the last God."38 Again, the genitive is
a peculiar one in that not only is the Event the revelation of Seyn, it is, or better,
reveals itself in, and as, that revelation, Da-sein, standing in the openness of beings
(Beitràge, p. 217). The last God.
Another leitmotif of Contributions is contained in the phrase Wesung der Lich-
tung des Sichverbergens : Da-sein, as the revealing of the clearing for self-
concealing, belongs to this self-concealing which reveals itself as the Event (Bei-
tràge, p. 297). Da-sein as the other beginning represents a unique being (einzigartiges
Seiendes, Beitràge, p. 296). Like Schelling, Heidegger reads John's Prologue through
the eyes of Philippians (2:6-8) : Heidegger speaks of the original revelation as a total
break (Zerkliiftung), revealing itself in the moment of the leaping forth of Da-sein in
(or into) the Event.39
Another of the important themes in Beitràge, also sounded in Schelling, is the
distinction Heidegger draws early on between the "first beginning" and the "other
beginning." The first beginning represents the truth of beings. The reaction is one of
wonder (Er-staunen) ; philosophy begins with wonder (Plato, Aristotle). The other
beginning experiences the truth of being (Wahrheit des Seyns), inquiring about the
being of truth (Seyn der Wahrheit), a truth that gradually dawns on one (Er-ahnen,
Beitràge, p. 179). In Heidegger, as in Schelling and the German idealists generally,
36. Beitràge, p. 472. According to Heidegger, it is not possible to inquire into the truth of Seyn (ibid., p. 449),
even though it is eminently question-worthy (Frag-wurdig, ibid., p. 413). Indeed, for Bultmann it is the
question : "Who are you ?" (Das Evangelium des Johannes, p. 165), and the answer is the egô eimi (I am)
of John's gospel, which, I submit, is precisely the meaning of Seyn in Heidegger's Beitràge. Da-sein is the
truth of Seyn that is in play, and well worth asking about (Beitràge, p. 313). Again, this is not a matter of
the truth of the being (Sein) of beings (the old metaphysics), but of the truth of Seyn (ibid., p. 428). The
truth of Seyn is not a metaphysical question : Das Seyn ist das Er-eignis (ibid., p. 470) ; in the face of Da-
sein metaphysics remains simply clueless (p. 472).
37. Beitràge, p. 227-228. And drawing upon the notion of leap (of faith) in Kierkegaard, Heidegger says that
there is a corresponding human leap into (Einsprung) Da-sein (ibid., p. 417).
38. "In der Wesung der Wahrheit des Seyns, im Ereignis und als Ereignis, verbirgt der letzte Gott" (Beitràge,
p. 24).
39. "[...] offnet sich nur in der Augenblicklichkeit des Vor-sprungs des Da-seins in das Ereignis" (Beitràge,
p. 75).
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GEORGE J. SEIDEL
creation (the first beginning) and the incarnation (the other beginning) are closely
linked. Heidegger speaks of the "other beginning" as the echo (Anklang) of the "first
beginning." This may account for the meaning of Anklang in the Beitràge (cf.
p. 107ff.). Thus, he says that the transcendence of Dasein in Being and Time is not
the same as the transcendence of the creator {Schopfer). (We will leave aside whether
there is any real transcendence in Being and Time.) At any rate, Heidegger insists that
the creator's transcendence totally disappears in Dasein (Beitràge, p. 217).
As suggested above, in this tradition the tie up between creation and incarnation
occurs in virtue of the idealist exegesis of the Prologue to John's gospel. In his Phi-
losophy of Revelation, Schelling insists that beginning and end, end and beginning,
should be thought of as coterminous : "The beginning of creation is also the begin-
ning of the testimony of the Son."40 Similarly in Heidegger, the last God is the end of
the other beginning. However, it is an end in the sense of an "And so forth," the
ultimate commencement (das Anfànglichste von Anfang an, Beitràge, p. 411, 416).
As Heidegger says, the Being-unto-death of Dasein does not end in nothing. Rather
the opposite ; it opens up from the beyond (aus dem Àufiersten) the openness of Seyn.
In this context death is not merely the outermost possibility of the Da (of Dasein),
but the inmost possibility of its complete transformation (Beitràge, p. 283, 325). The
intrinsic finitude of Seyn reveals itself in the beckoning (Wink) of the last God. No
un-loosing (Er-losung) occurs here ; rather, there is the grounding of Dasein in Seyn
itself, the "belonging to" of the human in Seyn through the (last) God. It is this that
sets up the conflict between the passing by of the last God and human history.41
In Schelling the last God spells the end of the old world of the Gods. With the
God become human, the infinite in the finite — so that the finite might become
infinite — the old world of the Gods is tragically fated to pass away. Likewise, in
Heidegger there is a flight of the Gods that have been (gewesenen Gotter) from their
positions of dominance (Beitràge, p. 408. Cf. also p. 235-237). We do not know the
laws according to which such must have occurred. There is the necessary element of
mystery involved in the eventful event (Er-eignung), in the revelation (Wesung) of
Seyn. However, Heidegger insists that the Wesung des Seyns is not itself the last God.
Rather, this revelation grounds the hiding through which the creative power of God
comes through (das Seyn durchgottet) in word and sacrifice, thought and deed (Bei-
tràge, p. 262). In Dasein's urgent standing in (Instdndigkeit) there is also a holding
back (Verhaltenheit) : the silence of the passing by of the last God (Beitràge, p. 406).
There is one significant difference — theologically a significant one — between
Schelling and Heidegger on the score of the future. For Schelling the last God looks
forward to, and prepares for, a new age. The new world is that of the Spirit, the
dominant soul of the new world. One hears no such voice in Heidegger. Rather, what
40. SW 6, p. 259, 323.
41. Beitràge, p. 410, 413. The word Erlôsung has the obvious religious and theological meaning of redemption
or salvation. However, Heidegger hyphenates the word, indicating that he wishes it understood in some
more original sense. I am unsure what that original sense is.
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HEIDEGGER'S LAST GOD AND THE SCHELLING CONNECTION
sounds concerning what is coming (Zu-kunftigen) is the Spenglerian note : "Our age
is one of decline" (Beitràge, p. 397).
According to Heidegger, knowledge, dialectic, system ("The period of the 'sys-
tem' is past," Beitràge, p. 5), etc., will not get us to the truth of Seyn. Nor can histori-
cal criticism (Historié) get at the true history (Geschichte) of Seyn as Event (Beitràge,
p. 494) ; it cannot get at the "in between" (Zwischen) of the true history of this en-
counter between-the divine and the human (Beitràge, p. 479). Although Schelling
may speak of the théogonie Ereignis as supra-historical (ubergeschichtliches, SW VI,
193), one suspects that Heidegger's references here are more to the distinction drawn
between Geschichte and Historié in Being and Time, as it is exemplified in the exis-
tential exegetical method of Bultmann.
IV
Toward the end of his Philosophy of Revelation Schelling offers that he has no
particular interest in appearing orthodox ; his interest is in explaining the phenome-
non of Christianity (SW VI, 593). Similarly, Heidegger's Christology in the Beitràge
— if I am correct in my reading — is certainly not a traditional one. Neither Heideg-
ger nor Schelling speak of the two natures in Christ. In Schelling's case the word
nature is just another word for Spirit, hence it can hardly be used in a contrast be-
tween divine and human natures. Heidegger, on the other hand, totally deconstructs
the Greek notion of nature (physis) so that it cannot really be used in a theological
context.
The two philosophers deal with the issue of Christology in terms of the philo-
sophical positions they have previously laid out. Thus, Schelling's presentation rests
heavily upon the notion of théogonie powers, and the tie up this has with conscious-
ness and subjectivity, even though he insists that the théogonie powers or potencies
have an objective, and not merely a subjective, meaning. For Heidegger, there is still
too much subjectivity involved in such a position.
Both Heidegger and Schelling look upon the Christ as an intermediary being. For
Schelling, the Christ is outside God in virtue of his humanity, independent of the
human in virtue of his divinity ; hence, neither, strictly speaking, divine nor human.
In Heidegger, likewise, the Da-sein that is revealed in the Er-eignis is a "Between" in
between the divine and the human. Now while it is true that some mutations of
gnosticism look upon the Christ as an intermediate being, there are other characteris-
tics of gnosticism which Heidegger clearly does not share. Heidegger's animadver-
sions to subjectivity indicate a strong reaction against any notion of esoteric knowl-
edge or gnosis in this connection. Similarly, often characteristic of gnosticism in a
Christological context is the view that the death of the Christ was merely apparent.
Heidegger's emphasis on the death of Da-sein, and the most awe-filled (furchbarste)
rejoicing attendant upon the dying of a God, death as the greatest testimony (hôchste
Zeugnis) of Seynwould certainly run counter to such a view (Beitràge, p. 230).
97

Page 15
GEORGE J. SEIDEL
Heidegger develops his own terminology in the formulation of his Christology.
There is a basis in the German idealist tradition for some of his choices of words, as
has been noted. His program of getting God out of metaphysics and being out of
theology is taken care of with the new "ontological difference" between Sein and
Seyn. Seyn is not God, but rather, as I read Heidegger, that which is revealed in the
revelation of Seyn in Da-sein. Schelling, in his version of the Trinity in terms of the
three potencies, has the Father (the first potency) as the Seyn of the Son. In Heidegger
Seyn is the divine side of the "in between." One may wonder what has happened to
the Father — as well as the Spirit — in the Heideggerian "Trinity."
I realize that this reading of Heidegger's Beitràge as containing his Christology is
a controversial one. It will be controversial for both Heideggerians and anti-
Heideggerians. Heideggerians prefer to think of Heidegger as theologically neutral,
even an atheist. Anti-Heideggerians see him as an unrepentant Nazi. So how can he
have a Christology ? To the Heideggerians it may be pointed out that the Freiburg
philosopher has always been a theist with a privative alpha, an a-theist. To the anti-
Heideggerians it may be said that even an unrepentant Nazi — perhaps especially an
unrepentant Nazi — has need of salvation. There is the remark Heidegger made in the
Der Spiegel interview : "Only a God can yet still save us."42 < Less
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Dettagli del prodotto

ISBN 978-1-4457-2139-2
Copyright Licenza standard di copyright
Edizione prima edizione
Editore gpdimonderose
Pubblicato marzo 11, 2010
Lingua Italiano
Pagine 129

 
Rilegatura Perfect-bound Paperback
Inchiostro contenuto Bianco e nero
Dimensioni (cm) 21.0 larghezza × 29.7 altezza

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